Household Wealth and Heterogeneous Impacts of a Market-Based Training Program: The Case of Projoven in Peru by Galdo, Jose et al.
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
Economics - Faculty Scholarship Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs 
9-9-2008 
Household Wealth and Heterogeneous Impacts of a Market-




Grupo de Analisis para el Desarrollo 
Veronica S. Montalva 
Sonia Moreau 
Laval University and PEP Network 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/ecn 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Galdo, Jose; Jaramillo, Miguel; Montalva, Veronica S.; and Moreau, Sonia, "Household Wealth and 
Heterogeneous Impacts of a Market-Based Training Program: The Case of Projoven in Peru" (2008). 
Economics - Faculty Scholarship. 143. 
https://surface.syr.edu/ecn/143 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at 
SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics - Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of 
SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265796
 
IDRC photo: N. McKee 
 
 
P O V E R T Y   & 
E C O N O M I C   P O L I C Y







P M M A  W o r k i n g  P a p e r  




Household Wealth and 
Heterogeneous Impacts of a Market-
Based Training Program:  
















Jose Galdo (McMaster University, IZA and GRADE) 
jcgaldo@grade.org.pe 
Miguel Jaramillo (GRADE) 
mjaramillo@grade.org.pe  




Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265796
 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the relationship between households’ wealth and heterogeneous 
treatment impacts for a market-based training program that has benefited more than 40,000 
disadvantaged individuals in Peru since 1996. We proxy long-run wealth by a linear index 
based on 21 household assets, and three main findings emerge. First, we find that voluntary 
choices among eligibles, rather than administrative choices, play a bigger role in explaining 
demographic disparities in program participation. Second, quantile treatment effects on the 
treated suggest important differences in program impacts at different quantiles of earnings, 
and strong differences in distributional impacts for men and women. Third, both parametric-
based and semiparametric regression-matching estimates reveal that the poorest among the 
poor benefit the same from the program. It is the type of institution that provides the training 
services that largely accounts for the heterogeneity of the impacts.  
Key Words: training, program evaluation, factor analysis, poverty, quantiles, matching 
methods. 
JEL Classification Codes: I38, H43, C13, C14 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most important empirical regularities that have emerged in the past 10 
years in the field of microeconometrics is the pervasive evidence of heterogeneous 
responses to policy interventions (Heckman 2001). The existing literature on impact 
heterogeneity is based on social experiments carried out in developed countries. The work 
of Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), for instance, represents one of the first attempts 
to systematically analyze distributional impacts within the National Job Training Partnership 
Act Study (JTPA). Black, Smith, Berger, and Noel (2003) report impact heterogeneity on 
unemployment insurance recipiency within the Kentucky Profiling and Reemployment 
Services. Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes (2007, 2006) also find strong evidence against the 
common effect assumption using welfare experiments in the United States (Connecticut’s 
Jobs First Waiver Program) and Canada (Self-Sufficiency Project). 
For developing countries, there is scant evidence about impact heterogeneity in 
social programs. Djebbari and Smith (2005) and Dammert (2007) are, to the best of our 
knowledge, the first studies that explore heterogeneous impacts of conditional cash transfer 
programs in Latin America. Both studies find that program impacts on wealth and nutrition 
are greater for households who were at a higher level of wealth and nutrition prior to the 
program. Corresponding evidence for public-sponsored training programs is non-existent for 
developing countries.  
In this paper, we analyze whether the poorest among the poor benefit less from 
active labor market programs that target disadvantaged youth. This research question is 
particularly relevant in Peru, as well as in many developing countries, where one observes 
large income inequalities within poor households (e.g., Escobal, Saavedra, and Torero 1998) 
and where the training system excels in reproducing initial poverty conditions among 
youngsters (Valdivia 1997; Jaramillo, Díaz, and Ñopo 2007). 
We use a non-experimental training program, the Youth Training Program 
PROJOVEN, which has provided training to around 40,000 disadvantaged young individuals 
aged 16 to 24 since 1996. The PROJOVEN program corresponds to a new array of demand-
driven training programs implemented in several Latin American countries in the midst of 
structural reforms in the mid-1990s. This “last generation” of active labor market policies is 
based on market-based approaches where public resources are assigned to training 
institutions via public bidding processes (see Chong and Galdo 2006). In this context, 
knowing whether this program produces the desired impacts or not constitutes a test of the 
effectiveness of market-based approaches in improving the employability and productivity of 
disadvantaged individuals. 
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Partial institutional evaluations have found that the PROJOVEN program is an 
effective labor market initiative with mean treatment impacts ranging between 12 and 100 
percent for earnings and between 0 and 15 percentage points for employment (Galdo 1998; 
Ñopo, Saavedra, and Robles 2001; and Chacaltana and Sulmont 2003). These “common 
effect” estimates are based on single-cohort data sets and focus on short-term treatment 
impacts. Two exceptions are Chong and Galdo (2006) and Díaz and Jaramillo (2006), which 
use data from five different cohorts to investigate the program’s short- and medium-term 
effects. The former investigates the relationship between the quality of the training services 
and beneficiaries’ subsequent earnings, while the latter focuses on mean treatment impacts. 
In this paper, we look at impacts across the entire distribution of the outcome variable. 
We use quantile treatment effects on the treated to estimate impacts on each percentile of the 
earnings distribution for men and women. Moreover, we exploit pre-treatment information on 
household assets to investigate the link between impact heterogeneity and households’ wealth 
status. This is important in assessing the program’s overall worth. For example, a program that 
raises the earnings of the most disadvantaged participants might be considered more 
successful than one that raises the earnings of only the least disadvantaged. Furthermore, we 
analyze the extent of ‘cream-skimming’ in PROJOVEN as the program has explicit 
performance rules that are tied to payments and penalties to training centers that may have an 
effect on the latter’s behavior regarding selection of trainees. We focus on both short- and 
medium-term treatment impacts using a comprehensive dataset that involves five different 
cohorts participating in the program from 1996 to 2004. 
To estimate heterogeneous treatment impacts across the wealth distribution, we 
construct an index based on the household asset information that PROJOVEN collects in 
order to assess eligibility of applicants. The basic methodology consists in approximating 
socioeconomic levels through a household’s asset index, which is based on principal 
component analysis of a determined number of asset variables. The method used here 
provides a simple technique for creating a long-run wealth proxy in the absence of either 
income or expenditure data (e.g., Filmer and Pritchett 2001; Gwatkin, Rutstein, Johnson, 
Pande, and Wagstaff 2000).  
We have three main findings. First, we find that voluntary choices among eligibles 
rather than administrative choices play a bigger role in explaining some demographic 
disparities in program participation when assessing the extent of cream-skimming in the 
PROJOVEN program. Second, the quantile treatment effects on the treated (QTT) show that 
impacts on earnings are concentrated among a relatively small number of participants and 
impacts for men are smaller but more evenly distributed than impacts for women. Third, both 
standard parametric and semiparametric matching models do not reject the null hypothesis 
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that treatment does not vary with the individuals’ initial poverty level. It is the type of training 
institution, which is largely related to the quality of the training itself, that may explain the 
heterogeneity of the impacts of the program.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly discuss 
the institutional context of the PROJOVEN program. Section 3 provides an overview of the 
program design and operation. We then present the evaluation data in section 4. Section 5 
presents the QTT impacts. In section 6, we develop the principal component analysis of 
household’s wealth status. In section 7, we report the parametric-based and semiparametric 
regression matching estimates. Finally, section 8 concludes.  
2. Institutional Analysis of PROJOVEN 
The economic context in which the PROJOVEN program was conceived was one of 
vigorous economic recovery after the implementation of an aggressive stabilization and 
structural reform agenda. Indeed, Peru in the early nineties was one of the countries that 
moved faster in the direction of opening up the economy, eliminating price controls (literally 
overnight), and restricting the role of the State in the economy. At the same time, fiscal and 
monetary policy reforms were implemented in order to restore basic macroeconomic 
equilibrium and reduce inflation.1 After a period of adjustment-induced recession, by 1993 
the economy was growing and in the following two years it was among the fastest growing 
economies in the region. Thanks to the brisk recovery and effective tax reform, by 1995 the 
country’s fiscal position had improved dramatically and increasing resources were being 
allocated to the social sector.2 
The financial market and trade liberalization contributed to reduce the relative price of 
physical capital, and thus allowed firms to acquire new capital and hire high-skill workers. As 
a result, employment growth behaved procyclically, but it was not equitably distributed 
among different social or demographic groups. Specifically, both unemployment (14 percent) 
and underemployment (60 percent) rates for youth more than doubled those for adult 
workers.3 This one group seemed to be in need of extra help in order to take advantage of 
the new economic environment. Providing pertinent training to disadvantaged youth was the 
choice policy response in this context. 
                                                 
1 See Jaramillo and Saavedra (2005) for a detailed account of policies during this period.  
2 Economic growth was a pre-condition for the Program to work. This was also one lesson from the 
Chilean experience (Marín 2003). 
3 Total urban population of Peru is around 18 million people, of which 25 percent is between 16 and 
24 years old. Participation in the labor force for this age group is large, accounting for more than one-
fourth. 
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Furthermore, the high levels of expenditures and income inequality in Peru are well 
documented (e.g., Escobal et al. 1998).4 Because income heterogeneity may affect the 
distributional effects of the program, income distribution among PROJOVEN’s target 
population, roughly the two lowest income quintiles, constitutes relevant information for the 
present study. Table 1 reports income distribution indicators for youth and households of the 
two lowest income quintiles. We observe that the income gap between the lowest and 
second lowest per capita income quintiles is similar among households than among youth, 
and the gap is large. In fact, average labor income of youth belonging to the second lowest 
income quintile is more than two times the income of the most disadvantaged youth. In 
addition, significant inequality also appears within each income quintile. It is noteworthy that 
inequality is higher within the lowest income quintile, with a standard deviation representing 
around 40 percent of the mean, than inside the second lowest income quintile, in which the 
standard deviation represents around 20 percent of the mean. These facts already suggest 
potential impact heterogeneity in the PROJOVEN program along pre-treatment earnings.  
Income inequality typically goes together, to some extent, with education and labor-
market inequalities; and all these three indicators can potentially influence the benefit level 
obtained by participants in the PROJOVEN program. In fact, even though general 
educational attainment is relatively high among urban youth, differences are significant 
across the distribution of income. Whereas the percentage of youth with complete secondary 
education is 72 percent in Metropolitan Lima and 60 percent in the urban area for youth 
belonging to the lowest income quintile, it reaches 90 percent in both areas for youth in the 
highest income quintile. Similarly, the percentage of youth with post secondary education is 
31 percent in Metropolitan Lima and 25 percent in the urban area for the lowest income 
quintile while around 66 percent for both areas for the highest income quintile.  
Labor market outcomes of the targeted population are also a crucial aspect to 
consider for training programs. The unemployment rates for disadvantaged young 
individuals (21 percent) more than double that for non-poor youth (9 percent). Moreover, the 
activity rates are not only broadly unequal between them but the proportion of poor youth 
working in non-paid family jobs reaches almost 25 percent, far above the 12 percent 
observed for non-disadvantaged youth. Furthermore, labor-earnings gaps for the youth are 
not only consistently large across the age-earnings profile but also increase through the 
years. Whereas the average labor earnings for non-disadvantaged individuals aged 15 and 
24 years old are approximately US$60 and US$150 respectively, the average labor earnings 
                                                 
4 The average monthly per capita expenditure is on average eight times higher for the highest income 
quintile than for the lowest income quintile in urban areas. On the income side, the difference is even 
bigger. The average monthly income is 14 times higher for the highest quintile than for the lowest one. 
Source: ENAHO 2004.  
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for poor individuals are quite flat (US$45) throughout the whole youth age-earnings profile 
(15 to 24 years old). This important fact, also documented in Saavedra and Chacaltana 
(2001), supports the focus of active labor market policies on this disadvantaged group and, 
at the same time, favors the strategy for using control groups within the poor population in 
the evaluation of the PROJOVEN program. The identification of the treatment impacts is 
plausible because the outcomes for treated and untreated poor individuals will follow a 
parallel path in the absence of the program, provided a set of observable covariates. 
In sum, average educational attainment is relatively high for youth, but unequally 
distributed: poorer youth tend to have significantly lower educational levels. Naturally, 
earnings are low among poor youth. In addition, significant variance in earnings is found 
both between and within the two lowest quintiles of the income distribution. This means that 
not all participants are on equal footing to take advantage of PROJOVEN, suggesting a 
potential for heterogeneous impacts. 
3. The PROJOVEN Program 
3.1 Goals and Treatment 
The Youth Training Program PROJOVEN is an ongoing active labor market policy 
that seeks to improve the productivity and employability of disadvantaged youth through 
labor training services. The PROJOVEN program was designed as a demand-driven 
program, with public and private training institutions competing for public resources through 
bidding processes. Since its creation in 1996, and for almost a decade, over 40,000 out-of-
school, unemployed poor individuals aged 16 to 24 years old have been selected as 
beneficiaries of PROJOVEN, and a total of 542 training institutions have participated in the 
program, providing more than 2,160 vocational courses.  
The PROJOVEN program provides funding for basic training in low-skill occupations. 
The treatment consists of a mix of in-class and on-the-job training organized into two 
sequential phases. The first consists of 300 hours of classes at the training center locations, 
roughly five hours per day for three months. The program covers the full cost of the courses. 
In addition, the program provides a stipend to trainees during these three months in the 
amount of US$2 dollars per day for men and women without children to cover for 
transportation and lunch, and of US$3 dollars for women with children under 6 years of age 
to cover childcare expenses. In the second phase, training institutions must place trainees 
into a paid, on-the-job training experience in private manufacturing firms for an additional 
period of three months. 
To ensure the paid on-the-job training experience, the program relies on a demand-
driven mechanism that stipulates that all training centers must present, as part of their offers, 
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formal agreements with private firms that guarantee internships remunerated (by the firm) at 
no less than the monthly minimum wage payment for each beneficiary. This design requires 
a strong match between the content of the training courses and the firm’s labor skill 
requirements. It supposes a strict coordination between the training institutions and firms 
when designing and implementing the training courses. As a result, the coverage of this 
program is limited because of its costly design (about US$515 dollars per trainee) and 
relatively intense package of services. 
3.2 Eligibility, Participation, and Cream-Skimming 
Figure 1 shows the dynamic of the beneficiary selection process for any given cohort. 
The program awareness strategy (position A) constitutes the first formal effort to reach out to 
the target population and aims to inform potential participants about the program’s benefits 
and rules. This first filter, under the responsibility of the program operator through local training 
offices, focuses only on those neighborhoods with a high concentration of households below 
the poverty line. Those prospective participants attracted by the expected benefits and 
perceived opportunity costs of participation voluntarily show up in the registration centers 
(position B), where qualified personnel determine their eligibility status. A standardized 
targeting system based on five key observable variables (poverty status, age, schooling, labor 
market status, and pre-treatment earnings) determines who is eligible and who is not. The low 
percentage of targeting errors shows the combination of self-targeting with individual 
assessment through objective indicators, which has been quite effective.5 According to the 
program’s operation rules, this process concludes when the total number of eligible individuals 
exceeds by around 90 percent the total number of slots available in each program. 
The eligibility status does not guarantee participation in the program. The program 
operator invites eligible individuals to an orientation process (position C), where they choose 
the courses they want to attend on a first-come-first-served basis. This process concludes 
when the number of eligible individuals exceeds by 75 percent the number of available slots 
in each course. Finally, the program operator sends this final pool of eligible applicants to the 
training institutions (position D). This is the only step in the process where training 
institutions intervene in the selection of participants and does not follow standardized criteria 
since each institution applies its own rules. 
Given a system of conditional payments based on center performance and flexibility 
to select from among the eligible population, training centers then have a strong incentive to 
                                                 
5 Targeting errors have been documented to be below 10 percent (Arróspide and Egger 2000). 
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enroll only those with the highest potential to complete and succeed in the courses.6 Thus, 
cream-skimming induced by performance standards is a legitimate concern in the 
PROJOVEN program because of its contribution to inequities in service delivery (Anderson, 
Burkhauser, and Raymond 1993). 
The availability of administrative data, where it is possible to identify eligibles from 
participants, provides an opportunity to disentangle cream-skimming from applicant’s self-
selection decisions. From 1996 to 2004, the period for which we currently have data, there 
are 21,253 eligible individuals corresponding to the first, second, fourth, sixth, and eighth 
cohorts of the program in Metropolitan Lima. A simple comparison of observable 
characteristics between eligibles and participants shows that they differ in several 
dimensions associated with human capital and poverty variables. Eligibles are on average 
older and a greater percentage of them are men. Moreover, eligibles are on average less 
educated than participants. Furthermore, the analysis of dwelling characteristics suggests 
some differences in socio-economic status between eligibles and participants, particularly in 
the sixth and eighth cohorts. Finally, we observe for all cohorts that a higher percentage of 
eligibles were employed when registering for the program. 
Program rules suggest that the training centers may have the ability to select the less 
disadvantaged among the eligible population and thus, cream-skimming may arise from 
administrative choices. A closer look at the data reveals, however, that 47 percent of those 
youth eligible and registered to participate in PROJOVEN drop out before being sent to a 
training institution. This is a very large percentage considering the rather short period of time 
(two to three months) between registering as eligible and being assigned to a course. In 
practice, it means that training institutions do not have the ability to sort out eligible 
individuals given the rules concerning the number of slots available in the program. In fact, 
the de facto eligibles-participants ratio is less than 1.25/1.0. This evidence suggests that 
voluntary choices among eligibles rather than administrative choices play a bigger role in 
explaining some demographic disparities in program participation, and thus, it is insufficient 
to compare participant and eligible populations when assessing the extent of cream-
skimming, as Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2001) pointed out.  
We also look at the factors behind the decision to participate in the program. To 
identify which characteristics are associated with participation in the PROJOVEN program, a 
probit model was estimated for each cohort where the value 1 is assigned to beneficiaries 
and 0 to eligibles that do not pursue the application process to its conclusion (positions C 
                                                 
6 Payments are structured in per capita terms according to the following scheme: 100, 80, 60, and 30 
percent if completing both phases of the program, at least a month of on-the-job training, only in-class 
training, and at least a month of in-class training, respectively.  
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and D in figure 1). Conceptually, one would expect that those dropping out are the ones 
facing the highest (direct and forgone) costs from participating. Opportunity costs will be 
higher for those who have relatively more human capital stock, those who already have a 
job, and those who would have to travel longer distances to reach the training institution. 
Participation and households’ wealth can also be positively correlated because of time 
preferences. Poorer households value more present income than future income. 
Table 2 reports the results. Gender is a significant predictor for three of five cohorts. 
Men are more prone to dropping out for all cohorts but the sixth. Results also indicate an 
inverse relation between age and participation, statistically significant for the sixth and eighth 
cohorts. It is the older who tend to drop out, which makes sense since they have a higher 
opportunity cost. Schooling is also a significant predictor across most cohorts. Eligibles with 
highest education level tend to participate in the program. This seems a counterintuitive 
result, as these youth have the highest opportunity cost. It is possible, however, that the time 
preferences effect dominates the opportunity costs effect within this economically 
disadvantaged population given the strong relationship between poverty and educational 
attainment. Thus, schooling may be proxy for socioeconomic status. The evidence regarding 
dwelling characteristics provides some backing for this interpretation as the estimates 
suggest that lower socio-economic status is associated with dropping out, although the 
evidence is not too conclusive as there are some mixed results across cohorts. The eighth 
cohort, the one with more observations and with more covariates available, reports most 
clearly the inverse relation between poverty and participation.7 
4. The Evaluation Data 
From 1996 to 2004, the PROJOVEN evaluation datasets consist of 10 different sub-
samples associated with five different cohorts of beneficiaries receiving treatment in Lima, 
and five corresponding comparison group samples.8 The beneficiary subsamples are 
selected by the program operator from a stratified random sample of the population of 
participants corresponding to the first, second, fourth, sixth, and eighth rounds of the 
program.9 
                                                 
7 Benavides (2006) provides qualitative evidence from interviews with poor youth in the 
neighborhoods where the program operates that suggests that costs of participation are behind the 
decision to drop out. Unfortunately, we cannot identify in the data at hand dropouts from the eligible 
individuals that are not chosen for the training institutions. 
8 These periods extend from November 1996 to April 1997; February 1998 to July 1998; March 1999 
to August 1999; June 2000 to December 2000; and August 2001 to January 2002, respectively. 
9 The total number of participants in these five cohorts is 1507, 1812, 2274, 2583, and 3114, 
respectively. The corresponding number of treated individuals in the random sample is 299, 321, 343, 
405, and 421. 
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Individuals in the corresponding comparison subsamples are selected from a random 
sample of “nearest-neighbor” households located in the same neighborhoods as those 
participants included in the evaluation sample aimed at reaching the same target population. 
In particular, once the treatment group individuals are chosen, a sample of comparison 
group individuals is selected by a survey fielded in the same poor neighborhoods where 
individuals from the treated group reside. The program operator uses the same eligibility 
instruments applied to the treatment sample and by pairing each beneficiary to a random 
neighbor who has the same sex, age, schooling, employment status, and initial poverty 
condition. The neighborhood dimension may have the ability to control some unobservables, 
including geographic segregation, transportation costs, and firms’ location, which may affect 
the propensity to work and the potential outcomes. This costly evaluation design greatly 
ameliorates support problems in the data, as we will see later.  
For each treated and untreated cohort combination, we have panel data collected in 
4 rounds, including a baseline and 3 follow-up surveys taken 6, 12, and 18 months after the 
end of the program. The baseline survey provides rich information for all variables that 
define the eligibility status applied to treatment and comparison group individuals at the 
same calendar time. It also contains demographics, detailed labor-market information, 
dwelling characteristics, including source of drinking water, toilet facilities, and infrastructure 
(type of materials used in the floor, ceiling, and walls), which is used to build a wealth index. 
In fact, relevant factors affecting both the propensity to participate in the program and labor 
market outcomes are available. Moreover, the follow-up surveys provide detailed labor-
market information for both treated and comparison groups, using the same definitions and 
variables as the baseline instruments. This minimizes potential biases due to misalignment 
in the measurement of variables, thus overcoming one of the main criticisms when solving 
the evaluation problem with non-experimental data (Smith and Todd 2005). The response 
rate to the initial survey was 100 percent and the attrition rates are small, ranging between 4 
percent (12 months after the program) to 7 percent (18 months after the program).10 
4.1 Comparison of Pre-Treatment Sample Means 
Table 3 compares the baseline means of several covariates for the treatment and 
comparison samples for each one of five different cohorts. Column 2 shows the means using 
the pooled sample and columns 3 to 7 show the means for five different programs. In terms 
of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, Panel A shows the effectiveness of the 
“neighborhood” strategy to balance the distribution of covariates that determine the eligibility 
status. Both groups have the same average age (19), sex ratio (42 percent are males), and 
                                                 
10 For the eighth cohort we only have data available for the first two follow up surveys. 
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schooling attainment (85 percent have completed high school). The p-values for all 
programs do not reject the null hypothesis of equality of means. However, the data show that 
both marital status and children variables have different distributions for treatment and 
control groups; estimated p-values reject the null hypothesis of equality of means in all 
cases.  
Panel B compares labor market characteristics for treatment and comparison 
samples. Both groups have the same proportion of individuals in and out of the labor force. 
Approximately 52, 25, and 22 percent of individuals were employed, unemployed, and out of 
the labor force, respectively. These non-significant differences are consistent across all 
cohorts. The type of work depicts a somewhat different pattern. A higher proportion of 
comparison individuals were working in the formal private sector (63 versus 54 percent) 
whereas a higher proportion of treated individuals were non-paid family workers (17 versus 
10 percent). A comparison of monthly earnings also shows that treated units receive on 
average smaller earnings than their counterpart comparison sample, which is a steady result 
across all cohorts. 
Panel C compares households and dwelling characteristics. The analysis of dwelling 
characteristics shows that a higher proportion of treated individuals live in houses with 
somewhat better infrastructure and access to flush toilet and piped water. These differences, 
however, are not significant for several cohorts. Finally, the father’s schooling attainment is 
similar in both samples.  
In summary, table 3 shows that the treatment and comparison group individuals are 
similar in several dimensions, including sex, age, schooling, employment, father’s education, 
previous training, and family size. This result reveals the efficacy of the “nearest-neighbor” 
approach to construct the comparison sample because of the balance of all variables that 
define eligibility status between treated and untreated groups. On the other hand, the data 
also reveal some significant differences in three key variables: marital status, children, and 
unpaid family workers, which will be taken into account in the empirical strategy.  
5. Heterogeneous Treatment Impacts in PROJOVEN 
In this section we study whether there is heterogeneity in the distribution of earnings 
impacts in the PROJOVEN program and discuss the hypothesis about distributional impacts 
in the program with estimates of quantiles treatment effects on the treated.  
5.1 Quantile Treatment Effects on the Treated (QTT)  
Quantile regression has been used to address heterogeneous treatment impacts in 
the context of training programs (Heckman et al. 1997, Friedlander and Robins 1997, 
Abadie, Angrist and Imbens 2002); welfare reform programs (Bitler et al. 2006, 2007); 
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conditional cash transfer programs (Djebbari and Smith 2005, Dammert 2007); and profiling 
unemployment insurance programs (Black et al. 2003). The appeal of this approach lies in 
its flexibility to accommodate observed and unobserved heterogeneity (Djebbari and Smith 
2005) and on the evidence that intra-group variation in quantile treatment effects greatly 
exceeds the inter-group variation in mean impacts (Bitler et al. 2006). 
This technique provides a convenient framework for examining how the impact varies 
at different quantiles of the untreated outcome distribution. Let Y1 and Y0 denote the 
outcome of interest in the treated and untreated states with corresponding CDFs   
 and . We can define the quantile treatment effect on the 
treated as Δ = , where the qth quantiles of each distribution is defined by 
 This parameter of interest gives the difference in 
earnings between treatment group and comparison group members at any given percentile 
after conditioning on participation. Note that this parameter does not directly identify the 
distribution of impacts, which refers to the impact of the program on the earnings of an 
individual at that percentile unless the program satisfies very strong assumptions.
1 1( ) Pr[ ]F y Y y≡ ≤
| 1QTE T
| 1 inf{ : (
q
j T jy y=
0 0( ) Pr[ ]F y Y y≡ ≤
1| 1 0| 1
q q
T Ty y= = =−
| 1}, 0,1.y q T j= =)F= ≥
11 
To estimate the quantile treatment effect on the treated we use quantile regression of 
monthly earnings (Y) on an intercept and a discrete variable {0,1}T = . The impact estimate 
for a given quantile q distribution is the coefficient on the treatment indicator from the 
corresponding quantile regression.12 Without further assumptions, the quantile regression 
coefficients do not necessarily have a causal interpretation. As in the matching literature 
(e.g., Heckman et al. 1997), we then assume “selection on observables” to correct for self-
selection into the program.  
We use the inverse propensity score-weighting approach (Imbens 2004). Denoting 
the estimated propensity score for person i as ˆ ( )ip x , we define the inverse propensity 
score-weighting for treated and untreated units as:  
1, 0,
1 1





T p xw w
p xT T= =
i
n
T−= = −∑ ∑ ,   (1) 
                                                 
11 If the ranking of individuals in the distribution of the outcome is preserved under the treatment, then 
this estimator is also informative about the distribution of impacts (Heckman et al. 1997). 
12 For instance, estimating the quantile treatment effect at the 0.50 quantile involves taking the sample 
median for the treatment group and subtracting the sample median for the control group. 
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which are used to estimate the effects of treatment on the treated.13  Under this approach, 




































y≤= ∑∑  (2) 
where  are the number of treated and comparison observations and I(.) is an 
indicator variable. This procedure corrects for bias in estimating quantiles of the 
counterfactual treated and control distributions when selection to treatment is based on 
observable variables and with the simple differences of sample adjusted quantiles then 
serving as consistent estimates of the population (see a formal proof in Firpo 2007).  
1n n n= + 0
)
                                                
For the implementation of the weighting approach we estimate the propensity score 
that predicts the probability that the individual i is in the treatment group conditional on a rich 
set of baseline covariates, . We estimate a logit model subject to the 
balancing test suggested by Dehejia and Wahba (1999).
( 1|P T X x= =
14 The set of conditioning covariates 
includes common demographic variables (sex, age, schooling, marital status, and number of 
children); labor market outcomes (past monthly earnings, employment status, type of work, 
previous training courses, duration of previous training); household characteristics (number 
of members, members/number of rooms, drinking water, flush toilet, dwelling’s quality 
materials); and father’s educational attainment.  
Table 4 reports the coefficients and standard errors for logit models estimated 
separately for each cohort. As expected, the covariates used to construct the comparison 
samples (age, sex, schooling, and employment status) are not significant predictors for 
program participation as they are balanced between treatment and comparison groups. In 
general, past earnings, experience, type of work, dwelling characteristics, father’s education, 
and family members/rooms are the most important predictors of participation in the 
PROJOVEN program. The estimates also show that married individuals and people with 
offspring are less likely to participate, although the coefficients are not significant for some 
cohorts. 
 
13 Alternatively, Bitler et al. (2004) estimate 1ˆ





p x p x
−= + −  to uncover treatment effects for the entire 
population. 
14 Parametric propensity score models that pass standard balancing tests are regarded as valid 
because they balance the distribution of pre-treatment covariates between matched units conditional 
on the propensity score. However, it is important to indicate that multiple versions of the balancing test 
exist in the literature, and little is known about their statistical properties or the relative efficiency 
among them.  
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5.2 QTT Estimates for Monthly Earnings 
We consider both earners and nonearners in our estimation to avoid neglecting the 
substantial share of program impacts resulting from increased employment rather than 
higher earnings to treatment individuals who would have been employed anyway. In 
considering these estimates it is important to note the percentage of treatment and 
comparison group members that did not report earnings in follow-up dates. For men, 30 
percent in the treatment group and 25 percent in the comparison group did not report 
earnings 6, 12, and 18 months after the program. For women, these numbers increase to 40 
and 52 percent. These numbers imply two important points. First, impacts on labor earnings 
will be concentrated among a relatively small number of participants. Second, impacts on 
labor earnings will be larger and more unevenly distributed for women than for men. 
Figure 2 plots the quantiles treatment impacts for monthly earnings 6, 12, and 18 
months after the program for both men and women pooled samples, to avoid large sampling 
variability due to small sample sizes. The associated dotted lines represent two-sided 90 
percent bootstrapped confidence intervals. Figure 2 shows that women in the first 40th 
percentile of the earnings distribution report identically zero treatment effects, reflecting the 
large number of non-earners. Men, on the other hand, show zero or negative treatment 
impacts in the first 30th percentile. Furthermore, the uneven distribution of the nonzero 
estimates is an additional indication of the concentration of earnings impacts. Women 
between the 50th and 70th percentiles report the highest treatment impacts, whereas for the 
80th and 90th percentiles the earnings gains decrease substantially in both the short- and 
medium-term. Men, on the other hand, show positive but small treatment impacts between 
the 40th and 70th percentiles, and negative treatment impacts for some percentiles in the 
bottom of the distribution. This last feature suggests that the strong push into employment 
for men relative to women indeed sacrificed some jobs at higher earnings levels.  
Strong disparities in labor participation rates between men and women in the 
Peruvian labor market are widely documented (Jaramillo, Díaz, and Ñopo 2007). Within the 
program sample, for example, the pre-treatment participation rate for men (62 percent) is 
much higher than that for women (45 percent). One would, therefore, expect that the primary 
effect of the PROJOVEN program should occur for those who find a job with program 
assistance but would not have found a job without the program. In addition, the PROJOVEN 
data show a large disparity in program completion rates between males and females. In fact, 
whereas 65 percent of women completed at least one month of on-the-job training, only 50 
percent of men did the same. Thus, it is expected that treatment impacts are smaller for men 
yet, at the same time, more evenly distributed for them since the skills upgrading is less 
dramatic than that for women. Furthermore, in developing countries one observes that men 
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and women face very different opportunity costs when deciding whether to participate in the 
labor market. Women are less forcefully pushed into employment because of household 
chores.15 As a result, women may be more selective about the jobs they take, allowing them 
to hold out for better job opportunities. This feature can strongly increase the unevenness of 
the impacts distribution for women relative to men because a larger percentage of women 
will decide to stay out of the labor force.  
Regardless of the certainty with which these underlying patterns may be inferred, 
figure 2 clearly shows higher treatment impacts for women across most percentiles of the 
earnings distribution and, at the same time, higher heterogeneity of the impacts on the 
distribution of earnings. For instance, whereas the impact on the median of the earnings 
distribution is US$22 for men 6 months after the program, it almost doubles for women 
(US$41). Moreover, the range of QTT earnings impacts is [US$0, US$24] for men and 
[US$0, US$71] for women 6 months after the program. These strong differences are the 
same whether we measure the impacts 6 or 18 months after the program.16  
We asked if it is possible to link the strong evidence on QTT impact heterogeneity to 
differences in household wealth. Put differently, are the poorest among the poor the ones 
located at the bottom percentiles of the QTT earnings distribution? These questions cannot 
be answered in the context of our QTE estimation unless we observe individual impact 
estimates for all sample members. If so, we can examine the frequency of the QTT 
estimates across different wealth categories. Rather, we test the role of households’ wealth 
as a source of heterogeneous treatment impacts by implementing alternative econometric 
estimators (such as standard OLS and matching methods) which allow us to test differential 
mean treatment effects across different wealth categories. It is noteworthy that this strategy 
represents a lower bound to the true extent of impact heterogeneity since the intra-group 
variation embodied in quantile treatment effects greatly exceeds the inter-group variation in 
mean impacts. 
6. Measuring Household’s Wealth 
Because household income or expenditure data are not readily available for 
treatment and comparison group individuals, we construct an asset index based on 
household asset information that PROJOVEN collects to assess eligibility of applicants 
following factor analytic methods. In contrast to expenditure data that is highly variable and 
sensitive to transitory fluctuations (Jalan and Ravallion 1998), the asset index is more stable 
                                                 
15 Research shows significant gender differences in time use in developing countries, with young men 
more likely to work for pay and young women more likely to do domestic chores. See, for instance, 
Levison and Moe’s (1998) findings for Peru.  
16 All figures in real values of December 2001. The exchange rate (dollar/sol) was 3.4.  
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(Fields 1998, Skoufias 1999) and contains less measurement error (Filmer and Pritchett 
2001) when predicting a household’s wealth status. 
By aggregating household assets, the index represents a proxy for long-run 
economic status rather than a measure either of current welfare or poverty. In fact, we are 
only establishing a relative measure -households’ ranking within the distribution-, which 
makes sense in the context of our empirical problem because all treated and comparison 
individuals are by definition below the poverty line. Because the weight each asset receives 
is not grounded theoretically, it is recommendable to perform empirical validation exercises 
to establish the robustness of the index. Evidence for some developing countries suggests 
that this approach is a robust measure of household wealth (Filmer and Pritchett 2001) and 
comparable to the results emerging from consumption expenditures in a sample of 19 
countries (Wagstaff and Watanabe 2003).  
6.1 Constructing the Wealth Index 
The baseline surveys the first, second, fourth, sixth, and eighth rounds of the 
PROJOVEN program, and includes information on 21 poverty indicators that can be grouped 
into four types: characteristics of the household’s dwelling (six indicators for the building 
materials used, two indicators for toilet facilities, two indicators for the source of drinking 
water, two indicators about rooms in the dwelling); household landownership, with two 
indicators; household’s participation in welfare programs; and parent’s education attainment. 
Escobal et al. (1998) show that these assets play a pivotal role in explaining the poverty 
status of Peruvian households in the 1990’s using expenditure data. 
To aggregate these various asset indicators into one variable to proxy for household 
wealth, we use the statistical procedure of principal components. The mathematical steps to 
perform the principal component analysis are detailed in Smith (2002). This technique 
essentially consolidates the data around the covariance structure of the variables under the 
assumption. In this particular context, this means that household’s long-run wealth explains 
the maximum variance-covariance in the wealth variables. Intuitively, it extracts from a set of 
variables those few orthogonal linear combinations of all the variables that capture the 
largest amount of information that is common to all of the variables (maximum variance). 
Then, it finds the second linear combination for the variables, orthogonal to the first, with 
maximum remaining variance, and so on. The first linear combination is called the first 
principal component of the set of variables.  
Once the asset index is obtained for each individual in the dataset, the individuals are 
ranked by their asset index score and divided into quintiles. Table 5 reports the weights (or 
scoring factors) from the principal component analysis implemented separately for each 
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cohort. The mean of the index is 0 for all rounds with standard deviation in the range 1.46 to 
1.93. Because the index ranks households within each distribution, the weights differ from 
program to program, although we observe similar patterns (signs) for all variables. In 
general, the characteristics of the household’s dwelling receive the highest weights across 
all programs. Because all the variables (except members/rooms) are categorical ones, it is 
easy to interpret the weights: a move from 0 to 1 changes the index by a factor equal to 
weight/standard deviation (reported in columns 3, 6, 9, 12, and 15). For instance, Column 3 
shows that a treated or comparison individual that lives in a household with flush toilet has a 
wealth index higher by 1.005 than one who does not. The last three rows of table 5 report 
the mean wealth index for three different groups of individuals that are assigned to the 
bottom quartile (“poorest”), second and third quartile (“poor”), and upper quartile (“less 
poor”), according to the value of their index. The difference in the mean index between the 
“poorest” and “less poor” individuals, as well as between the “less poor” and “poor”, is 
remarkable.  
To evaluate the internal validity of the wealth index we investigate the mean 
distribution of the asset variables across the different percentiles of the PROJOVEN 
population. We expect that the “poorest” group individuals have the lowest level of asset 
ownership whereas the “less poor” group individuals represent the highest level. Table 6 
reports the average asset ownership across the bottom (25 percent), middle (50 percent), 
and upper (75 percent) quartiles for all programs. We find, as expected, that the asset 
ownership differs consistently across these groups of individuals in all rounds of the 
program. By looking at the first three columns, we observe for instance that, whereas only 
the 3.3 percent of the “poorest” individuals have access to potable water, this percentage 
increases to 68 percent for “poor” individuals and to 97 percent for “less poor” individuals. 
Likewise, the house ownership increases from 36 percent (“poorest”) to 85 percent (“poor”) 
and 99 percent (“less poor”) in the second round of the program. Also, 62 percent of the 
“poorest” individuals in the fourth round of the program live in houses with low-quality walls 
(matting) versus 22 percent for the “poor” individuals and 0 percent for the “less poor” 
individuals. 
To evaluate the external validity of our wealth measures we use a standard 
representative household survey, the Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO), conducted 
in 2000 by Peru’s national statistical agency, the Instituto Nacional de Estadística e 
Informática. The availability of consumption expenditures and income data allows us to 
compare an asset index with both household per capita consumption expenditures and 
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household per capita income. The asset index is based on the same variables used in the 
PROJOVEN program with all measures computed only for Metropolitan Lima.17  
The results show a considerable fit between the wealth index and expenditures and 
income measures. The Spearman rank correlations across households are slightly higher 
when using the expenditures measures (0.59, p=0.000) rather than the income measures 
(0.54, p=0.000). We further examine the degree of agreement among the different measures 
by comparing how well the three classification measures overlap. We assigned households 
to the poorest 40, middle 40, and richest 20 percentiles using all three measures of wealth. 
Table 7 reports the results, where three main findings emerge. First, by looking at the 
expenditures measure (upper panel) we observe that 70 percent of those classified into the 
poorest category by consumption expenditures are also classified as poorest by the asset 
index. Moreover, only 4 percent of those classified into the poorest category by expenditures 
appear in the richest category by the asset index. Second, the classification on the middle 
and rich categories show somewhat less agreement, with 55 and 54 percent of those 
classified into these categories by consumption expenditures are also classified as middle 
and rich for the asset index. Importantly, only 3 percent of those classified into the richest 
category by expenditures appear in the poorest category by the asset index. Third, the 
results for the income measure (lower panel) are quite similar to those obtained with the 
expenditures data, which reassures us on the consistency among the three measures. 
7. Treatment Impacts across Wealth Status 
7.1 Parametric Treatment Impacts  
In this section we explore the heterogeneity of the impacts as a function of the 
estimated wealth index. It considers variation in treatment impacts through the interaction of 
the treatment indicator with the estimated long-run wealth status. If the PROJOVEN 
targeting mechanism is effective, one expects the poorest individuals to benefit the most 
from the program. 
Let  be the potential outcome in the treatment state 1( )Y q ( 1T )=  for an individual 
who is in the wealth quantile q and let  be the potential outcome in the untreated 
state . Our parameter of interest is the impact of treatment on the treated, which 
estimates the mean effect of attending a training course rather than not participating on the 
individuals who attend the course: 
0 ( )Y q
(T = 0)
                                                 
17 The survey has 2,572 respondent households. Household consumption and household income are 
computed by the statistical agency based on the survey’s more than 40 pages of questions on 
expenditures, consumption, and income. The data are available at 
www.inei.gob.pe/English/Consulta_por_Encuesta.asp. 
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1 0 1 0( ( ) ( ) | 1) ( ( ) | 1) ( ( ) | 1)TT E Y q Y q T E Y q T E Y q TΔ = − = = = − =   (3) 
While  may be estimated from the observed treatment sample, the 
right-hand side of the equation (3) contains the missing data . Because 
program participation in PROJOVEN depends on both observed and unobserved 
characteristics which lead to self-selection, one can proceed under the assumption that the 
distribution of systematic and unobserved differences varies across T=1 and T=0 but not 
over time within groups, which is the standard assumption of difference-in-differences 
models. However, this approach may be sensitive to the specific definition of the ‘before” 
period if we observe a drop in the mean earnings of participants prior to program entry 
(Ashenfelter 1978). In fact, Chong and Galdo (2006) document the existence of 
Ashenfelter’s Dip in the PROJOVEN program, which may lend an upward bias to the 
standard parametric difference-in-differences estimates. 
1( ( ) | 1)E Y q T =
0( ( ) | 1)E Y q T =
We then use an alternative econometric estimator that is consistent when the model 
of program participation stipulates pre-program earnings dip. We use a regression-based 
estimator of the difference between the post-treatment earnings of treatment and 
comparison group members, holding constant the level of pre-treatment earnings and a set 
of control variables (LaLonde 1986). We compare treatment and comparison individuals 
through a linear regression of the outcome variables Y (i.e., monthly earnings and 
employment) on the treatment status (T) and interactions between T and dummy variables 
indicating whether the individual i is in the top (“less poor”), middle (“poor”), or bottom 
(“poorest”) percentile of the wealth index distribution,  
0 1 3 2 2 0 1 3 2 2 , 1* * 'it i i i i i i i i t it itY q q T T q T q Y X .δ δ δ β β β γ α ε−= + + + + + + + +  (4) 
The individuals in the “poorest” group (q1) are the omitted group and, therefore, the 
implicit counterfactual. The interaction terms are expected to be positive if individuals from 
“less poor” (q3) and “poor” households (q2) benefit more from the program than individuals 
living in the “poorest” households (q1). Equation (4) also controls for other baseline 
household and individual characteristics (X) to account for empirical differences in the 
covariate distribution between treatment and comparison groups. The X-vector includes sex, 
age, schooling, marital status, offspring, and pre-treatment participation in training courses. 
This parametric approach estimates the effect of a treatment under the assumptions of 
selection on observables, and that simple linear conditioning on the covariates suffices to 
eliminate selection bias.  
We test whether the program impact along the wealth index is the same for all 
individuals by testing the following hypothesis:  
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1 2: 0Ho .β β= =  
Rejecting this null hypothesis is evidence of heterogeneous program impacts 
emerging from differences in individuals’ wealth status.  
Table 8 reports the results for both monthly earnings and employment outcomes for 
men (Panel A) and women (Panel B) samples. Two main results emerge. First, we do not 
reject the null hypothesis that treatment does not vary with the individuals’ initial poverty 
level. The p-values are above 0.10, and this is a stable result for both men and women and 
independent of whether we measure the impacts 6, 12 or 18 months after the program and 
the outcome of interest. This result suggests that the strong treatment heterogeneity on the 
earnings distribution emerging from the QTT approach is not due to the variation in the initial 
poverty level of the beneficiaries. Second, both earnings and employment treatment 
estimates are larger for women rather than men. This finding is in line with our QTT 
estimates.  
7.2 Matching Treatment Impacts 
We relax any linear assumption that may mask the earnings-wealth relationship by 
taking weighted averages over the outcomes of observationally similar untreated individuals. 
We implement both difference-in-difference and cross-section propensity scores matching 
methods that are better equipped to deal with the pre-treatment earnings dip after forcing 
one to compare individuals with the same pre-treatment observable characteristics. 
The identifying assumption justifying this matching estimator is that there is a set of 
conditioning variables X such that:  
0 0 ' 0 0 '( ( ) ( ) | , 1) ( ( ) ( ) | , 0)t t t tE Y q Y q X T E Y q Y q X T− = = − =
<
 (5) 
where t’ and t refer to before and after the start of the program (Heckman et al. 
1997). This conditional independence assumption ensures that after conditioning on a rich 
set of observable variables, the outcomes for treated and untreated individuals follow a 
parallel path. 
Matching methods force us to compare comparable individuals by relying on the 
common support assumption: 
Pr( 1| ) 1T X=  for all X.      (6) 
The support condition ensures that for each X satisfying assumption (5) there is a 
positive probability of finding a match for each treatment individual. In this sense, matching 
forces us to compare comparable individuals in a way that standard regression methods do 
not. Less than five percent of the observations are out of the empirical overlapping region, 
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which illustrates the relative efficiency of constructing comparison groups among eligible 
“neighbors”.18 
We use local linear kernel matching that relies on standard kernel weighting functions 
that assign greater weight to individuals who are similar in terms of the estimated propensity 
score (Heckman et al. 1998). The price to be paid for the greater flexibility of local linear 
matching is the selection of the bandwidth parameter that achieves the best possible trade-
off between bias and variance (Imbens 2004). We choose the bandwidth h to minimize the 
approximation to the mean integrated squared error (MISE) of the estimated counterfactual 
mean regression function associated with a particular bandwidth given by: 
(0 20 0 '
10
1 ˆ ˆMISE( ) arg min ( ) ( ( ), )
n
jt jt j j
h j
h Y Y m p
n −=
⎛ ⎞= − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ )x h .  (7) 
where  denotes the estimated conditional mean function for the 
untreated outcome evaluated at 
ˆ ˆ( ( ), )j jm p x h−
ˆ ( )jp x  using all of the untreated units except unit “j”. The 
benefit of this cross-validation approach comes from using out-of-sample forecasts rather 
than in-sample fit to guide the bandwidth choice. This approach implicitly weights the MISE 
calculation by the distribution of estimated propensity scores in the untreated sample. 
Operationally, this approach proceeds via a grid search over a set of candidate bandwidths 
specified in advance.19 
Table 9 presents both difference-in-difference (DID) and cross-section (CS) matching 
estimates for monthly earnings and employment outcomes for men (panel A) and women 
(panel B). Within each panel, we report three different parameters of interest: the average 
treatment effect on those located on the top quantile of the wealth index (“less poor”), the 
average treatment effect on those located in the second and third quantile (“poor”), and the 
average treatment effect on those located in the bottom quantile (“poorest”). In all cases, we 
estimate the counterfactuals using the full set of comparison group observations. The point 
estimates for the treatment impacts are presented along with their corresponding 
bootstrapped standard errors estimated with 500 replications.  
The results show three main patterns. First, there is again no evidence that the 
poorest among the poor benefit less from the PROJOVEN program. In this aspect, the 
PROJOVEN program is very effective in not reproducing commonly observed wealth gaps 
                                                 
ˆ ˆ( ) /1 ( )
18 To impose the support condition we follow the “trimming” procedure proposed by Heckman et al. (1998). 
19 The grid for the bandwidth search equals [0.05, 0.10,…, 2]. Relative to their frequency in a random 
population, the treatment group individuals are oversampled. Thus, we apply the matching methods to 
choice-based sampled data, and we thus use the log of the odd ratio p x p x−  as the matching 
variable (Heckman and Todd 1995). 
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on labor outcomes in the Peruvian labor market. On the contrary, the matching estimates for 
women suggest that the “less poor” individuals are benefiting somewhat less than the “poor” 
individuals. Second, the matching estimates show the PROJOVEN program is an effective, 
active labor-market initiative for women. For instance, 6 months after the program the 
earnings treatment impacts on the treated ranges from US$20 to US$27 and from US$23 to 
US$32 for women located on the top and bottom quantiles of the wealth index. Employment 
effects are also positive for women but not for men, reinforcing the previous OLS estimates. 
Third, the cross-section matching estimates are lower than the difference-in-difference 
estimates. This is explained by the existence of Ashenfelter’s dip in the PROJOVEN data. 
Notice, however, that these differences are modest.  
Because not everyone receives training in the same institution and the same 
occupation, both the type of training center and the occupation in which the participants 
receive training may potentially account for the heterogeneity of the treatment impacts. For 
instance, the quality of the training services may differ greatly among institutions as long as 
the level of educational specialization and experience varies, leading to potential 
heterogeneity of the impacts. Likewise, some occupations may have higher returns in the 
labor market independent of the quality of the training itself. 
There are five types of training providers in the PROJOVEN program: private 
business/manufacturing firms, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), post-school 
technological institutes (ISTs), occupational training centers (CEOs), and sectoral training 
centers.20 Using the quality index constructed by Chong and Galdo (2006) we find strong 
variation in the quality of the training services among these institutions. On average, private 
manufacturing firms offer the lowest quality (0.38), while sectoral training centers offer the 
highest one (0.68). With regard to the type of occupation, the distribution of funded courses 
in the PROJOVEN program is highly concentrated in textiles and apparel (45 percent) 
followed by services (22 percent), mechanics and metalworking (16 percent), and 
construction, carpentry, and shoemaking (15 percent).  
To address the role of training centers and occupation as possible sources of the 
heterogeneity in the impact of the program, we estimate a linear regression model using 
data on program participants who have enrolled in different training institutions and 
                                                 
20 The sectoral training centers in Industry (SENATI), Construction (SENCICO), Telecommunications 
(INICTEL), and Tourism (CENFOTUR) are funded by legally mandated contributions from employers 
in their respective sectors and primarily provide training specific to each one’s own sector, both in the 
form of careers or specific courses. The post-school technical institutes (ISTs) can be either public or 
private. Like the sectoral training centers, they are open to secondary school graduates and offer both 
three to four-year technical careers and individual courses. Finally, outside of the academic hierarchy, 
and unconnected to it, are the occupational training centers (CEOs). Admission to a CEO is not 
conditioned to any basic schooling requirement. 
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21courses.  We include a set of dummy variables that reflects the type of training center and 
occupation. The omitted categories are private business/manufacturing firms and 
mechanics/metalworking, respectively. We also include controls for other baseline 
household and individual characteristics, including the wealth index, to account for empirical 
differences in the covariate distribution among the treated individuals. Table 10 reports the 
results for both monthly earnings and employment outcomes. 
Three main patterns emerge. First, there is strong heterogeneity in the returns to 
training depending on the type of institution where one receives training. On average, 
individuals attending a sectoral training institution show the highest returns while individuals 
attending private business/manufacturing firms show the lowest ones. This is a robust result 
for both men and women and independent of the outcome of interest. Second, the level of 
heterogeneity is larger for women rather than men, which is consistent with the QTT results. 
Third, the type of occupation does not matter. A test of the joint significance for the 
occupation dummy variables is rejected for both outcomes of interest. Overall, these results 
reveal that neither the wealth status nor the occupation is the source of heterogeneity in the 
PROJOVEN program. It is the type of training institution, which is largely related to the 
quality of the training itself, that may explain the heterogeneity of the impacts of the program.  
8. Conclusions and Policy Discussion 
The Youth Training Program PROJOVEN corresponds to a new array of demand-
driven training programs implemented in Latin America in the 1990s in the midst of structural 
reforms in the labor markets. Similar programs have been implemented in Argentina, Chile, 
Uruguay, and Colombia. This “last generation” of active labor market policies is based on 
market-based approaches where public resources are assigned to training institutions via 
public bidding processes. In this context, knowing whether this program produces the 
desired impacts or not constitutes a test of the effectiveness of market-based approaches to 
improve the employability and productivity of disadvantaged individuals. 
Several of the findings presented in this report are of interest to policy makers. First, 
policy makers interested in enhancing equity aspects of social programs should be 
interested in the process of participation. We find that voluntary choices among eligibles and 
not administrative choices play a bigger role in explaining some demographic disparities in 
program participation. Identification of the factors that prevent the most disadvantaged from 
participating would be an important step in order to establish better targeting strategies.  
                                                 
21 We also estimate the same linear regression model, including the comparison sample and a 
dummy variable for treatment status. None of the qualitative results changed.  
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Second, regarding the impact of the program, the results indicate that PROJOVEN’s 
design is not only an effective mechanism to enhance productivity of economically 
disadvantaged youth, but it is also equity enhancing among groups of varying poverty levels. 
This result is likely related to the demand-driven mechanism, which ensures training only on 
those occupations with assured labor demand that avoids reproducing initial poverty 
conditions among youngsters.22  
Third, the positive assessment of the PROJOVEN program should be tempered by 
the existence of a high concentration of positive earnings impacts around the 40th and 70th 
percentiles. In particular, the strong heterogeneity of the treatment impacts can be explained 
by the type of institution that provides the training services rather than by the wealth status 
or the occupation in which the participants receive training. In this respect, the heterogeneity 
in the quality of the training services seems to be the determinant for the size of the 
treatment impacts as suggested by Chong and Galdo (2006). More research in this direction 
would be welcome. For instance, it seems more important for the program to rely more on 
the training services of sectoral training centers rather than private business firms. 
Fourth, both earnings and employment impacts are larger for women rather than for 
men, which suggest that interventions such as PROJOVEN are relevant options for policy 
makers interested in reducing labor market gender gaps. This is possibly associated with the fact 
that because of opportunity costs (compounded with discrimination, among other factors) 
women face greater difficulties in getting access to proper employment. Within this context, 
exposing the participant to a package of basic training and practical experience in the firm 
seems to go a long way towards changing the labor market prospects of the young women 
participating in the program. It should be noted that PROJOVEN’s design includes a stipend for 
single mothers to cover costs of childcare. This information is also important for the discussion of 
which groups should be targeted by this type of policy in the context of tight public budgets. 
Five, PROJOVEN seems to be a better fit to improve earnings of participants than 
changing their employment status, as impacts on earnings are consistently higher than on 
employment. In other words, while the training intervention seems adequate to produce 
changes in earnings it does not seem to work the same for employment. Thus, if the goal of 
the government is to improve employment opportunities of those youth who do not have a 
job, policy makers should consider specific modifications to the program. Short of starting a 
different program, it may be a good idea to experiment with a training module within the 
PROJOVEN setting specifically oriented to this goal.  
                                                 
22 The Peruvian training system excels in reproducing initial poverty conditions because poorer 
individuals only have access to very low-quality training institutions, perpetuating large labor earning 
gaps (Valdivia 1997). 
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Table 1: Income heterogeneity within the poor (in US$) 
Minimum Maximum Standard Youth MeanMonthly Income Monthly Income Deviation
Metropolitan Lima 
    Lowest Income Quintile 6 47 32 11
    Second Lowest Income Quintile 47 93 75 15
Urban Area 
    Lowest Income Quintile 1 47 30 13
    Second Lowest Income Quintile 47 93 73 14
Minimum Maximum Standard Household MeanMonthly Income Monthly Income Deviation
Metropolitan Lima 
    Lowest Income Quintile 0 124 77 36
    Second Lowest Income Quintile 127 211 173 25
Urban Area 
    Lowest Income Quintile 0 124 82 31
    Second Lowest Income Quintile 124 211 172 51
 
Source: National Household Survey (2004) 
Table 2: Coefficient estimates from Probit models for program participation 
















constant 0.032 0.920 0.610 0.170 0.650 0.071-0.119 -0.321 -0.090 -0.360*
A. Socio-demographic 
age 0.160 0.850 0.240 0.004 0.057-0.015 -0.002 -0.010 -0.0232*** -0.015*
0.106*** sex 0.130 0.001 0.240 0.008 0.006-0.077 -0.137*** -0.048 -0.094***
schooling
   secondary at most 0.732*** 0.641*** 0.005 0.174 0.250 0.439*** 0.005 0.000 0.819*** 0.000
   tertiary 0.800** 0.013 0.239 0.370 0.856*** 0.007 0.101 0.900 1.056*** 0.000
B. Labor information 
employed 0.540 0.000 0.990 0.013 0.830 0.130 0.037-0.042 -0.076 -0.074**
monthly earnings 0.056 0.330 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.660 0.000
participation in training courses 0.330 0.071 0.530 0.470 0.043 0.430 0.091 0.240-0.067 -0.049
hours of training 0.003 0.900 0.000 0.510 0.000 0.610 0.000 0.770-0.00171*** -0.003
C. Household characteristics
floor: high-quality 0.052 0.166 0.140 0.031 0.850 0.310 0.461** 0.043-0.108* -0.205
ceiling: high-quality 0.058 0.300 0.970 0.050 0.230 0.230 0.069* 0.069-0.020 -0.052
toilet: have the service 0.190 0.002 0.970 0.031 0.520 0.029 0.470 0.054 0.130-0.074
D. Household head’s schooling 
secondary at most 0.100 0.880-0.065 -0.005
tertiary 0.008 0.930 0.010-0.242***
Observations 2650 3691 4308 4489 5595
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Table 3: Treatment-Comparison groups summary statistics - PROJOVEN, Lima 1996-2004  
 
treated comparison treated comparison treated comparison treated comparison treated comparison treated comparison 
A. Socio-Demographic
age 19.64 19.75 19.75 20.24 20.24 20.23 20.19 19.96 19.42 19.66 18.75 18.73
sex (%) 42.94 42.53 43.62 43.29 44.03 44.15 40.7 40.92 42.72 42.46 43.64 42.20
schooling (%)
   incomplete primary 0.87 0.72 1.67 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.54 1.78 1.64 0.28 0.61
   complete primary 4.43 6.20 5.36 7.21 4.63 5.84 4.38 6.77 5.04 7.12 2.89 3.97
   incomplete high school 8.80 7.95 7.71 7.9 8.27 7.14 13.16 10.29 9.49 8.49 5.49 5.50
   complete high school 85.64 85.00 85.23 84.19 86.09 86.66 81.50 82.11 83.67 82.73 91.32 89.90
marital status (%) 
   single 91.26 77.34 91.27 69.41 90.72 76.62 90.90 77.23 89.02 77.53 94.21 85.01
   married and/or cohabitating 8.17 22.04 8.38 29.89 8.60 22.40 9.09 22.76 10.38 21.64 4.62 14.37
   other 0.56 0.60 0.33 0.68 0.66 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.82 1.15 0.61
have children (% ) 14.16 25.84 15.10 31.95 14.56 30.19 15.05 23.57 15.72 26.84 10.69 17.73
number of children 1.21 1.29 1.37 1.33 1.15 1.3 1.22 1.34 1.22 1.28 1.05 1.13
B. Labor information 
work status (%) 
   have a job 51.50 52.11 50.34 51.89 53.97 55.52 48.9 49.32 54.30 54.25 50.00 49.85
   unemployed 26.03 26.57 26.51 30.24 26.82 25.97 25.71 25.75 18.40 19.18 32.66 33.03
   out of labor force 22.47 21.33 23.15 17.87 19.21 18.51 25.39 24.93 27.30 26.58 17.34 17.13
kind of work (%) 
   self-employed 10.42 10.90 17.11 18.90 12.58 10.06 6.26 8.67 10.08 12.38 6.93 5.50
   worker in private sector 27.34 32.22 16.44 28.17 28.47 30.51 27.58 28.72 29.97 32.87 32.94 40.67
   worker in public sector 0.37 0.48 0.33 1.10 0.66 0.32 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.28 0.61
   unpaid family worker/ housekeeper 18.22 9.81 24.16 4.12 20.19 18.50 17.86 12.73 19.28 9.86 10.69 3.36
monthly earnings 91.43 127.39 73.97 142.00 102.54 126.00 99.84 115.10 89.82 131.83 90.57 123.00
participation in training courses 22.65 23.13 20.13 23.71 19.53 22.72 31.97 24.39 27.59 22.19 14.16 22.62
hours of training 58.02 56.64 60.66 36.60 25.15 40.13 105.00 40.28 81.08 84.90 17.83 76.95
C. Household Characteristics 
household members/ rooms 3.12 2.87 3.30 3.05 2.50 2.49 3.77 3.30 2.83 2.80 3.20 2.68
floor: high-quality 33.56 33.61 57.85 22.71 68.30 68.43 24.77 23.58 22.23 19.56 24.72 26.31
ceiling: high-quality 35.47 27.05 37. 79 12.83 42.16 42.24 36.25 26.02 31.28 22.55 32.97 22.51
walls: high-quality 67.64 63.44 63.87 57.43 75.00 75.49 70.00 66.23 63.24 54.89 62.91 58.19
drinking water 69.12 56.89 69.23 49.66 82.68 55.42 57.58 28.73 ---- ---- ---- ----
flush toilet 63.32 59.33 66.88 56.41 69.93 66.36 47.13 41.73 69.21 60.05 58.76 55.56
D. Parent's schooling 
father (%)
   complete high school 27.00 31.99 ---- ---- 27.15 26.95 23.20 23.31 27.30 36.44 30.06 41.59
mother (%)
   complete high school 18.02 21.77 ---- ---- 17.88 18.83 15.99 17.34 15.54 23.84 22.54 27.22
N 1602 1660 298 291 302 308 319 369 337 365 346 327
Pooled data 1st cohort 2nd cohort 4th cohort 6th cohort 8th cohort
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Table 4: Coefficient estimates from balanced Logit models for program participation - PROJOVEN, Lima 1996-2004 
 
covariates
A. Socio-demographic Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
constant -3.090 0.081 -3.113 0.005 -4.119 0.000 1.250 0.422 -3.560 0.001
age 0.086 0.108 0.140 0.002 0.101 0.031 0.019 0.701 0.104 0.039
sex 0.104 0.671 -0.177 0.402 0.057 0.770 0.022 0.910 0.139 0.487
schooling 
   incomplete primary 2.662 0.008 1.649 0.215 1.541 0.310 0.019 0.980 0.804 0.647
   incomplete high school 0.715 0.227 0.258 0.628 1.140 0.345 0.214 0.653 0.504 0.409
   complete high school 0.214 0.646 -0.419 0.331 0.606 0.186 -0.282 0.476 0.073 0.880
marital status 
   single 0.289 0.831 1.019 0.007 1.050 0.004 -0.055 0.962 1.117 0.011
   married and/or cohabitating -1.349 0.307 0.571 0.587 ---- ---- -0.528 0.639 2.335 0.023
have children -0.465 0.404 0.294 0.636 0.493 0.391 0.162 0.801 0.603 0.553
number of children 0.151 0.615 -0.901 0.048 -0.460 0.257 -2.959 0.175 -1.383 0.137
B. Labor information 
   have a job -0.913 0.312 -0.609 0.209 -0.969 0.136 -1.027 0.115 0.130 0.901
   unemployed -0.744 0.018 -0.108 0.704 -0.361 0.156 0.048 0.859 -0.118 0.657
kind of work 
   self-employed 1.490 0.105 1.764 0.002 0.589 0.427 2.040 0.004 0.459 0.672
   worker in private sector 1.334 0.155 1.438 0.006 1.092 0.117 1.936 0.005 -0.284 0.783
   unpaid family worker /housekeeper 2.911 0.001 0.781 0.051 1.257 0.040 1.847 0.002 1.120 0.270
monthly earnings -0.006 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 0.097 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 0.033
participation in training courses -1.217 0.006 0.675 0.144 -0.262 0.382 0.612 0.013 0.722 0.098
hours of training 0.005 0.006 -0.006 0.026 0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.038 -0.007 0.002
C. Household characteristics
household members 0.098 0.026 -0.084 0.040 0.493 0.391 -0.087 0.022 -0.053 0.158
household members/rooms in house 0.115 0.126 0.016 0.810 0.182 0.001 -0.070 0.365 0.318 0.000
floor : high-quality materials 1.658 0.000 -0.316 0.184 0.466 0.079 -0.080 0.715 -0.133 0.497
ceiling: high-quality materials 1.361 0.000 0.111 0.602 0.724 0.001 0.197 0.339 0.476 0.025
walls: high-quality materials -1.130 0.000 0.057 0.833 -0.511 0.021 0.254 0.200 0.067 0.729
drinking water piped  into house 0.894 0.002 1.625 0.000 1.731 0.000 -2.777 0.000 ---- ----
flush toilet -0.403 0.172 -0.415 0.103 -0.770 0.000 -0.487 0.260 0.084 0.644
D. Father's schooling 
no education ---- ---- -0.615 0.072 -0.403 0.318 -0.104 0.889 ---- ----
incomplete primary ---- ---- -0.388 0.585 0.129 0.862 0.636 0.345 0.116 0.875
complete primary ---- ---- -0.134 0.625 0.286 0.239 0.130 0.580 0.308 0.187
complete high school ---- ---- -0.141 0.612 0.054 0.846 -0.320 0.182 -0.231 0.323
higher education ---- ---- 0.237 0.546 0.327 0.372 0.549 0.184 0.293 0.495
N 589 610 688 702 673
R 2 0.34 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.14
Coefficients
1st cohort 2nd cohort 4th cohort 6th cohort 8th cohort
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Table 5: Wealth index estimates - PROJOVEN, Lima 1996-2004 
 
Notes: Each variable is normalized by its mean and standard deviation. The asset index is constructed by factor analytic methods. The weights 
are based on the first principal component.  
mean weights weight / mean weights weights / mean weights weights / mean weights weights / mean weights weights / 
std. dev std. dev std. dev std. dev std. dev
Floor: high-quality materials (concrete) 0.404 0.332 0.676 0.651 0.367 0.770 0.243 0.087 0.203 0.193 0.122 0.309 0.251 0.061 0.141
Floor: low-quality materials (earthen) ----- ----- ----- 0.318 -0.388 -0.834 0.755 -0.087 -0.202 0.787 0.067 0.164 0.732 -0.004 -0.009 
Ceiling: high-quality materials (concrete) 0.253 0.416 0.955 0.401 0.304 0.620 0.307 0.310 0.672 0.270 0.326 0.734 0.281 0.459 1.020
Ceiling: low-quality materials (matting) ----- ----- ----- 0.223 -0.327 -0.785 0.505 -0.311 -0.624 0.288 -0.329 -0.726 0.523 -0.289 -0.578 
Walls: high-quality materials (concrete) 0.606 0.479 0.980 0.749 0.377 0.873 0.683 0.023 0.049 0.508 0.306 0.612 0.510 0.328 0.656
Walls: low-quality materials (matting) ----- ----- ----- 0.097 -0.264 -0.899 0.263 0.347 0.787 0.079 -0.249 -0.920 0.051 -0.181 -0.824 
Flush toilet in the house 0.616 0.489 1.005 0.681 0.343 0.735 0.443 -0.281 -0.565 0.647 0.557 1.165 0.575 0.489 0.989
Pit Toilet/ latrine ----- ----- ----- 0.058 -0.194 -0.814 ---- ---- ----- 0.329 -0.542 -1.153 0.280 -0.499 -1.111 
Drinking water piped into the house 0.594 0.488 0.993 0.687 0.252 0.543 0.420 0.325 0.658 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
No drinking water ----- ----- ----- 0.096 -0.177 -0.602 0.246 -0.366 -0.849 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Household members/rooms in the house 3.182 -0.06 -0.037 2.425 -0.156 -0.094 3.525 0.082 0.046 2.816 -0.003 -0.003 2.954 0.020 0.013
Own house ----- ----- ----- 0.690 0.103 0.223 0.766 0.393 0.927 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Invaded land ----- ----- ----- 0.201 -0.130 -0.324 0.175 -0.424 -1.115 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Participating in welfare program 0.421 -0.062 -0.125 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 0.475 0.060 0.120
No education (father) ----- ----- ----- 0.019 0.003 0.022 0.020 -0.028 -0.199 0.023 0.024 0.161 0.033 -0.055 -0.306 
Complete primary schooling (father) ----- ----- ----- 0.173 -0.015 -0.040 0.234 -0.037 -0.087 0.199 0.046 0.115 0.183 0.164 0.424
Incomplete high school or higher (father) ----- ----- ----- 0.194 -0.024 -0.054 0.197 -0.033 -0.083 0.224 -0.056 -0.134 0.217 0.075 0.182
Complete high school (father) ----- ----- ----- 0.271 -0.003 -0.007 0.234 0.088 0.208 0.321 -0.003 -0.006 0.355 -0.166 -0.347 
Higher than high school (father) ----- ----- ----- 0.075 0.031 0.118 0.081 0.038 0.139 0.058 0.017 0.073 0.041 -0.077 -0.390 
Wealth index quartile 1 ("poorest") -2.09 -2.83 -2.21 -2.10 -1.98
Wealth index quartile 2 & 3 ("poor") 0.10 0.45 0.23 0.23 0.06
Wealth index quartile 4 ("less poor") 1.90 1.96 1.76 1.70 1.87
2nd cohort 4th cohort 6th cohort 8th cohort1st cohort
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Table 6: Means of wealth assets - PROJOVEN, Lima 1996-2004 
 
Note: Unweighted means. The bottom quartile of the wealth index represents the "poorest" category, the second and third quartile represent the 
"poor" category, and the top quartile represent the "less poor" category.  
 
poorest poor less poor poorest poor less poor poorest poor less poor poorest poor less poor poorest poor less poor
Floor: high-quality materials (concrete) 0.15 0.34 0.78 0.12 0.74 0.99 0.17 0.27 0.27 0.09 0.17 0.35 0.18 0.31 0.20 
Floor: low-quality materials (earthen) ----- ----- ----- 0.87 0.20 0.00 0.83 0.73 0.73 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Ceiling: high-quality materials (concrete) 0.00 0.12 0.78 0.03 0.31 0.94 0.05 0.25 0.69 0.01 0.14 0.80 0.00 0.12 0.88 
Ceiling: low-quality materials (matting) ----- ----- ----- 0.58 0.39 0.05 0.54 0.58 0.31 0.52 0.31 0.00 0.66 0.70 0.03 
Walls: high-quality materials (concrete) 0.07 0.68 0.99 0.26 0.87 1.00 0.24 0.75 1.00 0.22 0.52 0.77 0.23 0.51 0.78 
Walls: low-quality materials (matting) ----- ----- ----- 0.30 0.04 0.00 0.62 0.22 0.00 0.16 0.08 0.00 0.14 0.03 0.00 
Flush toilet in the house 0.04 0.72 0.97 0.23 0.75 1.00 ---- ---- ------ 0.01 0.80 1.00 0.02 0.68 0.92 
Pit Toilet/ latrine ----- ----- ----- 0.18 0.03 0.00 0.73 0.45 0.15 0.93 0.18 0.00 0.88 0.12 0.00 
Drinking water piped into the house 0.03 0.69 0.97 0.39 0.71 0.94 0.12 0.39 0.77 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
No drinking water ----- ----- ----- 0.23 0.08 0.00 0.59 0.20 0.00 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
Household members/rooms in the house 3.39 3.24 2.89 3.18 2.35 1.82 3.32 3.47 3.84 2.85 2.89 2.62 2.96 2.87 3.12 
Own house ----- ----- ----- 0.62 0.67 0.81 0.36 0.86 0.99 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
Invaded land ----- ----- ----- 0.30 0.21 0.08 0.58 0.06 0.00 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
Participating in welfare program 0.51 0.45 0.28 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 0.45 0.47 0.51 
No education (father) ----- ----- ----- 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02 
Complete primary schooling (father) ----- ----- ----- 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.28 0.24 0.18 0.16 0.20 0.23 0.15 0.17 0.24 
Incomplete high school or higher (father) ----- ----- ----- 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.24 0.16 0.17 0.24 0.23 
Complete high school (father) ----- ----- ----- 0.27 0.29 0.23 0.16 0.24 0.31 0.35 0.30 0.33 0.49 0.34 0.24 
----- ----- ----- 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.02 
1st cohort 2nd cohort 4th cohort 6th cohort 8th cohort
Table 7: Comparisons of expenditures and income with asset index 
classifications 
 
Source: Household Survey Data (ENAHO 2000). Consumption expenditures and income 
measures are based on 2572 respondent households. The asset index is constructed by factor 
analytic methods.  
Groups Based on Expenditures Data 
Groups Based 
Pooreston Asset Index Middle Richest
Poorest 70 27 3 
30 55 15 Middle
4 42 54 Richest
Groups Based on Income Data
Groups Based 
Pooreston Asset Index Middle Richest
Poorest 66 26 7 
29 56 14 Middle
6 41 52 Richest
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Table 8: OLS treatment impacts by sex, pooled data - PROJOVEN, Lima 1996-2004 
Men
Earnings Impacts Employment Impacts
 
Notes: Point estimates are in real soles. The parametric specification includes as regressors age, education, sex, marital status, pre-treatment 
earnings, whether has children, number of children, and whether participate in previous training. Also, it considers dummy variables for the 
"poorest", "poor", and "less poor" groups. The "poorest" group indicator is the omitted group. 
coeff. std. err. coeff. std. err. 
6-months 12-months
coeff. std. err. 
18-months
coeff. std. err. coeff. std. err. 
6-months 12-months
coeff. std. err. 
18-months
45 25 17 27 42 33 -0.040 0.049 -0.061 0.048 0.012 0.058Treatment
35 38 -18 45 -0.039 0.069 -0.023 0.067 0.080Treatment*less poor-21 -42 -0.015
30 1 33 Treatment*poor -39 -77 40 0.000 0.060 0.030 0.058 0.070-0.070
Ho: β1=β2 =0 0.5754 0.2043 0.1187 0.519 0.359 0.425
178 178 178 0.620 0.620 0.620Baseline Mean
1294 1294 978 1294 1294 978N 
Women 
coeff. std. err. coeff. std. err. coeff. std. err. coeff. std. err. coeff. std. err. coeff. std. err. 
Treatment 72 18 72 19 37 27 0.072 0.047 0.044 0.047 0.118 0.054
Treatment*less poor4 26 -6 27 29 38 0.013 0.068 0.041 0.067 -0.017 0.078
Treatment*poor 25 22 23 23 75 32 0.094 0.057 0.091 0.057 0.006 0.065
Ho: β1=β2 =0 0.3463 0.2269 0.1745 0.166 0.387 0.728
Baseline Mean 88 88 88 0.440 0.440 0.440



















Table 9: Matching treatment impacts by sex, pooled data - PROJOVEN, Lima 1996-2003 
Notes: Point estimates are in real soles. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 replications are in parentheses. The propensity scores 
estimates follows from logit models. 
Difference-in-differences and cross-sectional matching is applied to the sample of individuals inside the overlapping support region. The matching 































CS DID CS DID CS DID
Poorest 55 (37) 59 (33) -1 (38) 5 (34) 40 (46) 34 (42) -0.066 (0.088) 0.054 (0.057) -0.117 (0.092)
Poor 26 (29) 29 (26) 31 (30) 38 (24) 2 (36) 1 (33) -0.017 (0.052) 0.024 (0.052) 0.011 (0.063)
Less poor 15 (37) 45 (31) -13 (30) 15 (27) 17 (44) 22 (41) -0.130 (0.074) -0.016 (0.057) -0.123 (0.080)





DID CS DID CS DID
Poorest 110 (19) 80 (23) 81 (24) 54 (23) 74 (36) 42 (34) 0.124 (0.076) 0.118 (0.069) 0.081 (0.099)
Poor 117 (15) 95 (15) 100 (20) 85 (17) 112 (18) 93 (26) 0.207 (0.057) 0.158 (0.057) 0.190 (0.059)












88 88 88 Baseline Mean 
Table 10: OLS estimates for type of training institution and occupation 
18 months after the program - PROJOVEN, Lima 1996-2004 
 
Notes: Point estimates are in real soles for monthly earnings. The parametric specification 
includes as regressors wealth index, age, education, sex, marital status, pre-treatment earnings, 
whether has children, number of children, and whether participate in previous training and dummy 
variables for type of training institution and training occupation. The estimation is based on the 







Wealth index -0.013 0.015 0.000 0.011
Employment 
0.008-0.003
Type of Training Institution 
0.201      Sectoral 0.153 0.090 0.231 0.086 0.059
0.229      ISTs 0.202 0.131 0.230 0.111 0.064
0.118      ONGs 0.153 0.109 0.100 0.083 0.065
0.187      CEOs 0.149 0.095 0.191 0.075 0.058
0.129 0.156 0.099 0.138 0.081 0.062     Other
Occupation 
0.033 0.054 0.006 0.077 0.040     Textiles and Apparel -0.032
     Services 0.075 0.033 0.081 0.046-0.038 -0.033
0.044      Construction/Carpentry/Shoemaker -0.008 0.056 0.134 0.114 0.050
Wealth index -5 8 3 6
Monthly earnings
0 5
Type of Training Institution 
66      Sectoral 76 50 90 44 31
36      ISTs 66 74 9 56 45
33      ONGs 105 61 10 42 35
54      CEOs 79 53 41 38 30
26 113 56 41 33     Other -13
Occupation 
21 30 39 31     Textiles and Apparel -62 -36
     Services 42 41 24-30 -48 -40
     Construction/Carpentry/Shoemaker 32 59 27-8 -83 -8
N 488 661 1149
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